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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between foreign investment and the containment
measures, in the aftermath of the COVID-19 spread. We nd that the non signicant correlation
between the average quarterly stringency index and inward foreign investment at the end of
the rst quarter of 2020 hides a source of heterogeneity across countries. Foreign investors
highly rate the implementation of strong containment measures - as measured by government
stringency index - in countries with high risk - as measured by the risk of openness index.
Conversely, foreign investors are less attracted by assets issued by countries adopting weak
stringency measures despite a high risk of openness, or those implementing drastic stringency
measures in the presence of a relatively lower risk of openness.
Keywords: International Investments, COVID-19, stringency index, risk of openness index.
JEL Classications: G11, G15, G30
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1 Motivation and relevance
As the COVID disease has spread around the world, many government have been forced to impose
restriction policies with di¤erent intensity and timing (Hale et al. (2020)): some countries have rapidly
introduced very strict measures in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, such as total lockdown, and
then have removed them, as a consequence of an improvement in the transmission; other countries
instead reacted with more gradual and punctual interventions, as soon as small outbreaks occurred.
The economic and nancial consequences of these restrictions cannot be properly evaluated yet,
and any attempt of making predictions can be incautious: the literature on the impact of epidemics
on nancial markets is indeed scarce, and all parallels with other natural disasters or terroristic
attacks are bound to be unreliable (Godell (2020)). However, it is evident that the COVID outbreak
has already lead recession, erosion of condence and higher uncertainty (OECD (2020b)).
The growing recent literature about the impact of the COVID outbreak on nancial markets
generally converges on the evidence of a signicant impact of COVID conrmed cases or deaths on
nancial marketsvolatility and liquidity (Albulescu (2020); Baig et al. (2020); Salisu and Vo (2020);
Ashraf (2020)).
As far as international investments are concerned, Saurav et al. (2020) highlight that the COVID-
19 crisis represents for international enterprises a new and unprecedented source of investor risk that
is depressing investor condence. OECD (2020a) and OECD (2020c) assess that foreign direct in-
vestments of rms are expected to decline sharply as a consequence of the pandemic and of the
stringent public health measures to limit the spread of the COVID-19, with a notable heterogeneity
across countries. Emerging economies have already experienced a massive drop of portfolio invest-
ment inows, because international investors transfer capital back home, or invest in safer assets
during periods of uncertainty. Giofre(2020a) conrms that, within a generalized decline in foreign
investment, advanced countries, with higher GDP per capita, members of the G7 group, or of the
Euro area are signicantly less severely hit by the pandemic than emerging and developing countries.
Kizys et al. (2021) study the e¤ects of the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, whose
higher scores are associated with greater stringency, on herding behavior in international stock mar-
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kets during the coronavirus COVID-19 outbreak. They disclose the presence of herding behavior
in the rst three months of 2020 in 72 countries stock marketscountries, but also highlight that
this herding behavior is mitigated by more stringent government response to the coronavirus crisis,
by way of reducing multidimensional uncertainty. Giofre(2020b) nds that the average stringency
index is not correlated with inward investment positions, but the within-country standard deviation
of the stringency index is positively and signicantly correlated with inward portfolio investments at
the end of the rst quarter of 2020: foreign portfolio investments, typically more volatile and reactive
than foreign direct ones, are more responsive to governmentsprompt reactions than to gradual ones
at the end of the rst quarter, thus suggesting that the former policies might be perceived as a more
serious commitment to stem the spread of COVID-19.
This paper contributes to the literature by further investigating the presence of a signicant
cross-country heterogeneity in the relationship between foreign investment and the government con-
tainment measures, at the end of the rst quarter of 2020. Investors scrutinize sources of risk and
the means through which this risk can be reduced. Foreign investors could be therefore deterred
from or attracted by investing in a country adopting more radical stringency measures, depending
on how these policies are perceived in terms of commitment to stability, lower uncertainty, and then
higher adjusted risk-returns in the near future. We nd indeed that the non signicant correlation
between inward foreign investment at the end of the rst quarter of 2020 and the average quarterly
stringency index hides an important heterogeneity across countries: the response of investorsbehav-
ior to the adoption of severe measures depends indeed on the level of pandemic risk in the economy.
Specically, the extent to which severe containment measures - as measured by government strin-
gency measures (SI) - signicantly a¤ect the inward foreign investment in a country would crucially
depends on the country level of risk directly connected with the non adoption or removal of these
stringency measures - as proxied by the risk of openness index (ROI).
The empirical evidence actually shows that foreign investors, at the end of the rst quarter of
2020, value the assets issued by countries, which calibrate the stringency measures to the risk of
openness. On the one hand, they highly rate the implementation of strong containment measures
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in countries with high risk of openness. On the other hand, they appear to avoid investing in those
countries adopting weak stringency measures despite a high risk of openness, or those implementing
drastic stringency measures in the presence of a low risk of openness.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we sketch the estimable
equation. In Section 3, we describe the data, and provide some descriptive statistics. In Section 4,
we report the results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Estimable equation
Our objective is to establish the evolution of international investments in the immediate aftermath
of the adoption of COVID-19 containment measures.
We empirically test the existence of a relationship between the average stringency index in a
country and its end-of-period (quarter/semester) foreign liabilities.
Lets dene, rst, the growth of liabilities (L) in the rst quarter (q1) of 2020 as q1: it is
the di¤erence between the liabilities at the end of the rst quarter (March 2020, L03_20) and the
liabilities at the end of 2019 (December 2019, L12_19), scaled by the liabilities at the end of 2019
(December 2019, L12_19):
L = q1  (L03_20 L12_19)=L12_19 (1)
We compute this growth in liabilities also for the rst semester (s1) of 2020.
s1  (L06_20 L12_19)=L12_19 (2)
where L06_20 is the value of foreign liabilities at the end of the second quarter of 2020.
In our main specication, we regress the growth in foreign liabilities on the average within-country
stringency index (SI); risk of openness index (ROI), and their interaction (SI ROI), as follows:
L = + (SI) + (ROI) + (SI ROI) + controls+ " (3)
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We are mainly interested in the sign and size of the ,  and  coe¢ cients. If the adoption of
severe stringency of containment measures (SI), or a high risk of openness (ROI); deter foreign
inward investment, then we should observe a signicant negative ; or ; coe¢ cient, and vice versa.
If the risk of openness (ROI) in one country a¤ects the way severe stringency measures (SI) are
perceived and valued by foreign investors, then we should observe a signicant  coe¢ cient.
We trade-o¤ a parsimonious specication, due to the low number of observations, with the need
to include time-varying regressors, which might contribute to explain the growth in foreign invest-
ments, and covariates potentially correlated with our main regressors, whose exclusion could bias the
estimated coe¢ cients. It is worth stressing that, we can ignore any country-specic xed e¤ects, as
these are removed by the construction of the dependent variable in di¤erence form.
We include, rst, the (lagged) appreciation in the Nominal E¤ective Exchange Rate (NEER),
because its change might have a¤ected foreign investment. Second, we control for the number of
new COVID-deaths and its within-country standard deviation, as the stringency index is potentially
strongly correlated with the health indicators of the epidemic. Finally, we include two binary indica-
tors of economic and nancial development, to control, for instance, for the presence of any eventual
ight to quality propensity by foreign investors.
We consider two alternative denitions of the dependent variable in the analysis. Beyond the
measure of liabilitiesgrowth derived in equation (1), we add the measure diffL, in the attempt
to address the issue of seasonality of foreign investment allocations: it is derived as the di¤erence
between the 2020 L measure, as dened in equation (1), and the corresponding measure in 2019.
For instance, diffq1 is the rst quarter measure, and is dened as follows:
diffq1  q12020 q12019 (4)
and, analogously, diffs1 is dened for the semi-annual period as:
diffs1  s12020 s12019 (5)
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To estimate the parameters in equation (3), we adopt, in the baseline specication, a Robust Least
Squares estimation. Ordinary least squares estimators are sensitive to the presence of observations
that lie outside the norm for the regression model of interest. The sensitivity of conventional regres-
sion methods to these outlier observations can result in coe¢ cient estimates that do not accurately
reect the underlying statistical relationship. Robust least squares refers to a variety of regression
methods specically designed to be robust, or less sensitive, to outliers. Among Robust least squares,
we adopt the M-estimation developed by Huber (1973).1 Alternative estimation methods, such as
standard OLS and Quantile regressions, are run for comparison with our baseline results.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
We consider foreign inward investment (or foreign liabilities) in 53 countries, upon data availability.
Data are drawn from the International Investment Position Statistics, released by the IMF, which
provides information on foreign assets and liabilities, classied in several categories and instruments,
at a quarterly frequency. For most of the analysis, we consider Foreign Total Liabilities (FTL), but
in the last table we also consider its sub-components, Foreign Direct and Foreign Portfolio Liabilities.
The source of COVID-related data is a Github ongoing repository of data on coronavirus, the
Coronavirus Open Citations Dataset.
We draw from this dataset our main regressors relying on the Oxfords Coronavirus Government
Response Tracker (OxCGRT) (Hale et al. (2020)): the stringency index (SI), which represents a
proxy for the severity of the containment policy measures adopted and the Risk of Openness Index
(ROI), based on the recommendations set out by the World Health Organisation (WHO) of the
measures that should be put in place before Covid-19 response policies can be safely relaxed. We
also include data about new COVID-deaths and cases per million of inhabitants. All these data are
originally reported at a daily frequency, but we construct the corresponding quarterly averages, in
order to match the quarterly frequency of the dependent variable.
1Our results are robust to alternative Robust Least Squares methods, such as the S-estimation and the MM-
estimation (results not reported, but available upon request).
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We include in our specication other three controls. First, the NEER (Nominal e¤ective ex-
change rate, broad index), released by the Bank for International Settlements. Then, we include two
binary indicators of economic and nancial development, i.e., the GDP per capita and the market
capitalization per GDP, drawn from CEIC data.
In Figure 1 and 2, we report the distribution an main descriptive statistics of the dependent
variable. Figure 1 considers the growth of FTL in the rst quarter of 2020, while Figure 2 considers
the growth of FTL in the rst semester of 2020. Panel a) in both gures relies on the  measure
dened in equation (1) and (2), while panel b) relies on the diff measure dened in equation (4)
and (5). We can observe, rst, that the  measure is more negatively skewed in the rst quarter,
than in the rst semester. Second, the distribution of the measure diff, dened in equation (4) and
(5), is more negatively skewed than the  measure, in both the rst quarter and the rst semester.
In Figure 3, we report the distribution and main descriptive statistics of the average quarterly
Stringency Index (SI) in the rst and second quarter.
The average stringency index, whose original values range 0-100, is about 19 in the rst quarter,
while in the second quarter grows to 71, thus pointing to a sharp tightening of the anti-COVID 19
containment measures in the second quarter of 2020.
Figure 4 reports the distribution and main descriptive statistics of the average quarterly Risk of
Openness (ROI) in the rst and second quarter. While the mean slightly increases in the second
quarter of 2020, the median in almost una¤ected, and the standard deviation decreases.
In Table 1, we report the correlation matrix of the COVID-related regressors included in the
analysis. Statistically signicant correlation coe¢ cients are reported in bold characters (with p-
values in brackets). The correlation between new COVID-deaths and new COVID-cases per millions
are signicantly correlated in both quarters (0.578 and 0.296). The Stringency Index is signicantly
correlated with new COVID-deaths, only in the rst quarter (0.219), and is never signicantly corre-
lated with the Risk of Openness Index. The latter is signicantly correlated with new COVID-cases





In Table 2, we report the main ndings of our multivariate regression analysis for the rst quarter,
under a Robust Least Squares estimation. The dependent variable is the growth in Foreign Total
Liabilities (FTL), as dened in equation (1), at the end of quarter (or semester). As anticipated in
Section 2, the fact that the dependent variable is dened in di¤erence form, allows us to ignore any
problem related to country-specic xed e¤ects, removed by construction. We are forced to keep a
parsimonious specication, because we can rely on a quite limited country sample. We include, on
the one hand, time-varying regressors which might concur to explain the growth in foreign liabilities,
and, on the other hand, covariates potentially correlated with our main regressors, whose exclusion
could bias the estimated coe¢ cients.
Our main regressor is the Stringency Index (SI), based on the Oxfords Coronavirus Government
Response Tracker, and is computed as the quarterly average of daily data. We include, as a rst
control, the (one-month lagged) growth in the Nominal E¤ective Exchange Rate (NEER), a measure
of the appreciation of the economys currency against a broad basket of currencies, because its
change might have a¤ected foreign investment in the country.3 Second, we control for the quarterly
average of new COVID-deaths per million of inhabitants: as shown in Table 1, the stringency index
is correlated with this specic indicator of the epidemic, as it represents the government reaction to
contain new cases, deaths, and intensive-care treatments.4
Finally, we include two binary indicators of economic and nancial development, GDP per capita
2New COVID-cases and new COVID-deaths are always included as alternative controls. To account for the sig-
nicant correlation of the SI and ROI indexes with the new COVID-death per million (or new COVID-cases per
million), we have also performed our regression analysis excluding these covariates, with no signicant e¤ect on our
results.
3We include its one-month lagged value, to avoid endogeneity issues.
4Our ndings are left qualitatively unchanged, when considering a regression specication with the new COVID-
deaths per million of inhabitants in logs, rather than in levels.
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and market capitalization to GDP. Since country specic factors are swept away by construction of
the dependent variable in di¤erence form, we do not include the level of development of individual
countries. We consider, instead, two indicators of development, equal to 1 if the country belongs
to the developed group, and 0 otherwise, in order to control for the presence of a ow of foreign
investments towards high versus low developed countries: according to the ight to quality rationale,
for instance, in the presence of a global shock, foreign investors would deviate their investments to
more stable and developed economies.5
We can notice that in column (1) of Table 2 the coe¢ cient of the stringency index is not signi-
cant, and the only signicant coe¢ cients are the ones related to economic and nancial development.
In particular, the coe¢ cient of the economic development indicator is positive and statistically signif-
icant, while the coe¢ cient of the nancial development dummy variable is negative and (marginally)
signicant. These latter ndings are in line with the results in Giofre(2020a), which reveal that
investment in less developed countries have been more dramatically reduced by the COVID out-
break. It is worth noticing that while the positive e¤ect of the economic development dummy
(high_GDP_cap) is more reliable, since stable and signicant across di¤erent regression specica-
tions, the negative coe¢ cient of the MCAP/GDP binary variable, as already pointed out in Giofre
(2020a), is instead not reliable, since unstable in terms of signicance and sign across regression
specications.
In column (2) of Table 2, we add the quarterly average Risk of Openness Index (ROI) as a
covariate, in order to check whether the risk of relaxing containment measures and opening to social
and economic activities has a¤ected the growth in foreign liabilities. We observe that both indexes
are not signicant determinants of the growth in total foreign liabilities in the rst quarter.
We conjecture however that the non signicant e¤ect of the stringency measures on foreign
liabilities could hide a cross-country heterogeneity. We test in particular if the response of one
countrys inward foreign investment to its governmentcontainment policy depends upon the risk of
openness faced by the same country. Investors are interested in monitoring sources of risk and the
5Since these controls are not available at a quarterly frequency for most of countries, we include their latest yearly
available datum.
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means to reduce it, and their behavior can be particularly reactive to government actions aimed at
challenging severe risks. We conjecture therefore that the importance of strong containment measures
- as measured by government stringency measures (SI) - could crucially depend on the level of risk
directly connected with the non adoption or removal of these measures - as measured by the risk of
openness index (ROI).
We add to our regression model the interaction between the stringency index SI and the risk of
openness index ROI: if our hypothesis is correct, we should observe a positive signicant coe¢ cient
of the interaction term, thus suggesting that foreign investors consider the impact of the containment
measures more e¤ective in economies with a higher risk of openness.
While the results in column (3) do not fully support our initial conjecture, they point to a promis-
ing direction. The coe¢ cient of ROI is negative and signicant (-0.383), while the coe¢ cients of SI
and of the interaction term SI  ROI are not statistically signicant.6 However, the non signicant
coe¢ cients are close to statistical signicance, and their sign is consistent with our predictions: the
coe¢ cient of SI is negative with a p-value equal to 0.121, while the coe¢ cient of SI ROI is positive
and its p-value is 0.104.
In column (4), we replace the number of "new COVID-deaths per million of inhabitants" with
the covariate "new COVID-cases per mn of inhabitants". Ashraf (2020) nds that stock markets
reacted more proactively to the growth in number of conrmed cases as compared to the growth in
number of COVID deaths. We nd that our ndings are qualitatively una¤ected by the introduction
of this alternative covariate, in terms of signicance and size of coe¢ cients.
The explanatory note of the ROI index species that the OxCGRT data cannot say precisely
the risk faced by each country, it does provide for a rough comparison across nations. Even this high
levelview reveals that many countries are still facing considerable risks as they ease the stringency
of policies . We check whether accounting for the natural "measurement" error implicit in the
construction of any index, and then considering it less "literally", helps supporting our hypothesis.
6The large size of the ROI coe¢ cient is due to the denition of the risk index, ranging 0-1: if ROI passes from
a risk of openness equal to 0 to a risk equal to 1, then the growth in foreign liabilities drops by about 38% (or,
equivalently, an increase from 0 to 0.1 implies a drop of the dependent variable by 3.8%).
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We construct therefore a binary variable for each of the two indexes, ROI and the SI, splitting
countries into those above and those below their respective mean.
Interestingly, we observe in column (5a) that the results corroborate our hypothesis, when both
indexes are dichotomized. To interpret the e¤ects, it is worth considering that the default-excluded
group in the regression is the subset of countries with a below the mean SI and ROI. We observe
rst that, in the rst quarter of 2020, countries with a high SI and a low ROI feature a 5.79% lower
growth in FTL, while countries with high ROI and low SI display a 4.3% lower growth in FTL. Those
countries adopting high SI in the presence of high ROI display instead a signicantly larger growth
in inward foreign investment, as shown by the coe¢ cient of the interacted term (10.54%). To seize
the overall growth in FTL for countries with high SI and high ROI relative to countries with high
SI and low ROI, we need to add the coe¢ cient of the interaction term to the "pure" e¤ect of the SI
index: compared to countries with high SI and low ROI which witness a decrease in FTL by 5.79%,
those countries with high SI and high ROI display a higher FTL by 4.75% (=-5.79%+10.54%).
This nding supports our conjecture that foreign investors are inuenced by the implementation of
stringency indexes as long as these measures are meant to reduce a high risk of openness. Conversely,
foreign investors in general appear to discard the assets issued by those countries whose containment
policies are relatively mismatched with the risk of openness, that is, those adopting weak stringency
measures despite a high risk of openness, or those implementing drastic stringency measures in the
presence of a lower than average risk of openness.
In column (5b), we check whether our ndings are sensitive to a di¤erent specication of the
threshold -median instead of mean- for dening the binary version of the two indexes, and we observe
that the ndings are substantially unchanged.
Finally, columns (6a) and (6b) replicate the regressions of columns (5a) and (5b), when the
"number of new COVID-deaths per million" is replaced by the "number of new COVID-cases per
million", and results are conrmed, with only modest changes in the size of the coe¢ cients.
Table 3 replicates Table 2, but the dependent variable relies on the diff measure, whose
structure is dened in equation (4), rather than on the  measure. This measure aims to address the
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issue of the seasonality of foreign investment allocations, as it is derived as the di¤erence between
the 2020 measure, and the corresponding measure in 2019.
This table provides results very similar to the ones reported in Table 2. In the rst two columns,
we observe no signicant coe¢ cients, but in the third column, we nd some hints in support of our
hypothesis, as the coe¢ cients of the SI and of the ROI index are negative, while the coe¢ cient of
the interaction term SI ROI is positive. However, when replacing the "new COVID-deaths" control
with the "new COVID-cases", all coe¢ cients, with the exception of ROIs, fall below the standard
bar of statistical signicance. As in Table 2, only when considering the indexes in a dichotomic
version, the sign and signicance of coe¢ cients get consistent with our conjecture. In column (5a),
we observe that in the rst quarter of 2020, countries with high SI and low ROI witness a decrease
in FTL by 6.41% with respect to 2019, while those countries with high SI and high ROI indeed
display an increase in FTL by 2.09% (=-6.41%+8.50%).
A comparison with Table 2 reveals that the e¤ect is still present and statistically signicant, thus
supporting our hypothesis, although the e¤ect on the growth of FTL in the rst quarter of 2020,
as a di¤erence to the corresponding quarter of 2019, is halved in size. Results are conrmed, when
considering the median threshold rather than mean for the construction of the binary indexes of SI
and ROI (column (5b)), or when considering the alternative covariate "new COVID-cases" under
both specication of the threshold (columns (6a) and (6b)).
Table 4 reports the results of Table 2 and 3, but relative to the end of the second quarter, so that
the dependent variable becomes the growth in liabilities at a one-semester distance. For the sake of
brevity, we report only the relevant regressors. The upper part of the table (panel I) refers to the
 measure, while the bottom part (panel II) refers to the diff measure, dened as the di¤erence
between the growth of FTL in the rst semester 2020 with respect to the rst semester in 2019. We
observe that, di¤erently from the rst quarter, the SI and ROI indexes have no signicant role in
driving foreign investorsdecisions at the end of the second quarter, under any specication of the
indexes, or of the dependent variable.7
7We only observe in panel I, some sparse and non systematic negative signicant coe¢ cients of the ROI index.
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The empirical evidence shows that the measures of containment and the risk of openness may
help explain the foreign investorschoice in the immediate aftermath of the COVID outbreak, but
not in the second quarter.8
4.2 Sensitivity checks and additional analysis
In the remainder of the paper, we undergo our ndings to a bunch of robustness checks and additional
studies, to understand the strengths and limits of the analysis.
In Table 5, we check the sensitivity of our rst quarter signicant ndings to the estimation
strategy and specication of the country sample.
As in Table 4, the upper part of the table (panel I) refers to the  measure, while the bottom
part (panel II) refers to the diff measure.
The rst three columns, consider alternative estimation models, while columns (4) to (5c) consider
di¤erent country sample specications. At the head of the rows, we specify that the indexes are
dened in dichotomic form (SI_d and ROI_d). In column (1) of panel I and II, we report, for
comparability, the results of column (5a) of Table 2 and Table 3, following the Robust Least Squares
baseline approach.
Column (2) reports the results of the regression under an OLS specication, which are qualita-
tively similar to the ones in column (1). Columns (3) report the results of a Quantile regression.
The quantile regression estimates are more robust against outliers in the response measurements:
whereas the method of least squares estimates the conditional mean of the response variable, quan-
tile regression estimates its conditional median (or other quantiles). We show that, in the rst panel,
the results relative to the median of the response variable are fully in line with our previous ndings,
both in terms of signicance and size. Conversely, panel II, where the dependent variable is dened
as the di¤erence between the growth of FTL in the rst quarter of 2020 and the corresponding growth
in 2019, displays less robust results, with a (marginally) signicant coe¢ cient of the interaction term
8Notice that the di¤erence in the number of observations from the rst quarter to the rst semester is due to two
missing observations for June 2020 (Croatia and Malaysia). Results are unchanged, when balancing the sample and
excluding Croatia and Malaysia also in the rst quarter.
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SI ROI; and a (marginally) non signicant coe¢ cient of the SI term (p-value 0.11).
In columns (4) to (5c) of panel I and II, we test whether our ndings survive to the exclusion of
specic countries from the sample.
In column (4), we exclude China. China has been the rst country to be struck by the COVID
spread, several weeks before other countries. The estimate of the stringency measures on foreign
investorschoices at the end of the rst quarter could therefore have been signicantly driven by
Chinas asynchronic timing of lockdown and loosening measures.
By comparison with column (1), we observe that the exclusion of China, in both panels, hardly
a¤ects the size and signicance of the e¤ects, which remain still sizeable and signicant.
In columns (5a) to (5c) of Table 5, we exclude from the sample potential o¤shore nancial centres,
to make sure our results are not driven by economies distorting investorsdecisions for reasons hard to
control in our analysis. We consider three di¤erent classications proposed by the literature: column
(5a) reports the results under the classication proposed by Damgaard et al. (2018), column (5b)
follows Zoromé (2007), while column (5c) follows Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017) (see Appendix A.1,
for details on the countries excluded). By comparison with column (1), we observe that qualitatively
the results are conrmed, and interestingly, the exclusion of o¤shore centres even reinforce them:
both the negative coe¢ cient of the SI index and the positive coe¢ cient of the interaction term
SI ROI are larger in size, and even more statistically signicant.
In the two following tables, Table 6 and 7, we perform additional analysis, to match our ndings
with the evidence of the recent empirical literature on the evolution of foreign investment, after the
spread of the COVID contagion.
In particular, OECD (2020a) and OECD (2020c) assess that foreign direct investments of rms
are expected to decline sharply as a consequence of the pandemic, with a notable heterogeneity across
countries, and that emerging market economies have indeed already experienced a massive drop of
portfolio investment inows, because international investors transfer capital back home, or invest in
safer assets during periods of uncertainty. Giofre(2020a) conrms that, within a generalized decline
in foreign investment, advanced countries, with higher GDP per capita, members of the G7 group,
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or of the Euro area have been signicantly less severely hit by the pandemic than emerging and
developing countries.
In Table 6, we check whether accounting for di¤erent country grouping invalidate or modify our
ndings. In columns (1a) and (1b), we report, for comparison, the results of columns (5a) and (5b)
of Table 2. Columns (#a) report results when the two OxCGRT indexes are recoded as binary
indicators with the mean as threshold, while in columns (#b) the threshold is the median. We
consider di¤erent alternative to the GDP per capita to dene the group of advanced economies
following Giofre(2020a), and we also nd that foreign investment in these countries have been less
severely hit by the crisis, as the coe¢ cients of the dummy associated with advanced, G7 and Euro
area countries are positive and statistically signicant, also after accounting for the binary OxCGRT
indexes and their interaction.
We observe that when we include as control a dummy for advanced economies, results are very
close to our baseline; when we include, as a control, the G7 group, the coe¢ cients of the SI and
SI  ROI are signicant only is dichotomized around the mean, though the size of the interaction
terms coe¢ cient is smaller; nally, when controlling for the Euro area country group, we observe
consistent coe¢ cients of the interaction terms (though smaller in size), but no signicant negative
coe¢ cient of the SI regressor (i.e., for countries with high SI and low ROI):
Finally, we check how our results are a¤ected by the inclusion of the standard deviation of the
stringency index (SI) in our regression specication. Giofre(2020b) nds that the within-country
standard deviation of the stringency index is positively and signicantly correlated with foreign
inward investments, at the end of the rst quarter of 2020, but only as far as portfolio investments
are concerned. She suggests that foreign portfolio investors, typically more reactive than foreign
direct investors, could have be more responsive to governmentsprompt reactions than to gradual
ones in the immediate aftermath of the outbreak, since the former policies could have been perceived
as a more serious commitment to stem the spread of COVID-19.
Our model specication provides an alternative explanation to the non signicant e¤ect of the
SI index on foreign investment: we check within a unied framework if the two pieces of empirical
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evidence are consistent or mutually exclusive. If countries with a higher standard deviation in SI are
also those with a higher risk of openness, by omitting one of the two factors makes the coe¢ cients
of the included covariates biased.9 We consider a regression specication including both regressors,
to shed light on the drivers of the growth in foreign inward investments. Since Giofre (2020b)
underlines a di¤erent role for portfolio and direct inward investments (that is, foreign direct and
foreign portfolio liabilities), we consider their respective growth, together with the growth of total
foreign inward investments.
In Figure 5, we show the main descriptive statistics and the distribution in the rst quarter of
the growth in Foreign Direct Liabilities (FDL) in panel (a) and of Foreign Portfolio Liabilities (FPL)
in panel (b). We observe that the growth for FPL is more negatively skewed than the distribution
of FDL.
To allow an immediate comparison across di¤erent types of liabilities, we report the coe¢ cients
of our regressors of interest in Table 7, which is horizontally partitioned into three panels: panel I
refers to FTL, panel II to FDL, and panel III to FPL.
Lets focus, rst, on how our ndings are a¤ected by the inclusion of the SI as a regressor, and,
then, on how the results in Giofre(2020b) are altered by imposing our framework.
In panel I, the regression setting is the same as in Table 2, with the addition of the standard
deviation of the stringency index (SI) as a regressor. We observe that the coe¢ cient of the SI
regressor in the rst two columns is not signicant, as in our previous ndings. Also after including
the interaction term between SI and ROI, we do not observe any signicant coe¢ cient of SI, either
when controlling for the new COVID-deaths (column (3)) or when controlling for the new COVID-
cases (column (4)). When we instead recode the SI and ROI indexes in a dichotomic form (columns
(5a) to (6b)), we nd again a statistically signicant coe¢ cient of the interaction term SI  ROI;
consistently with our hypothesis, while the negative coe¢ cient of the SI is statistically di¤erent from
zero only when the threshold of the dummy is the mean (columns (#a)).10
9The correlation of the rst quarter SI with the average stringency index SI is equal to 0.18 (and only marginally
signicant: p-value=0.098), while its correlation with the average risk of openness index ROI is equal -0.03 (but not
statistically signicant at any conventional level).
10A coe¢ cient of the SI regressor not statistically di¤erent from zero, implies that countries with a high SI and
16
The evidence on the SI regressor is fully in line with the results of Giofre(2020b) for FTL,
both in terms of sign (positive), signicance (marginal), and size (about 0.3%) of the associated
coe¢ cient.
In panel II and III, we compare Foreign Direct Liabilities and Foreign Portfolio Liabilities. Giofre
(2020b) nds that foreign direct inward investment have shown a lower responsiveness to SI, than
foreign portfolio inward investments. Indeed, also in our setting, we conrm that the coe¢ cient
of the SI is almost twice as large for FPL than for FDL, and its statistical signicance is much
stronger and systematic.
Lets now consider how the interaction of the two OxCGRT indexes may have di¤erently a¤ected
the growth in foreign direct and foreign portfolio liabilities.
When considering the dichotomic version of the SI and ROI indexes in columns (5a) to (6b), we
observe the following di¤erences between FDL and FPL.
On the one hand, the coe¢ cient of the interaction term SI ROI is signicant only for columns
(#a) for FDL, while is always statistically di¤erent from zero for FPL (though only marginally, when
the threshold is computed over the median); on the other hand, the overall e¤ect of countries with
high SI and highROI is larger for foreign portfolio liabilities than for foreign direct liabilities. Indeed,
though the negative coe¢ cients of the SI regressor and the positive coe¢ cients of the interaction
term SI ROI are larger (in absolute value) for FDL than for FPL (when both are signicant), the
overall net e¤ect of high SI in economies with high ROI on foreign liabilitiesgrowth is smaller
for FDL than for FPL: in column (5a) it is 0.0210 (=-0.0819+0.1028) for FDL versus 0.0267 (=-
0.0639+0.0906) for FPL, while in column (6a) it is 0.0103 (=-0.0899+0.1003) for FDL versus 0.0225
(=-0.0554+0.0780) for FPL.
Moreover, we observe that in columns (3) and (4) of panel III, the coe¢ cients of SI, ROI; and
SI  ROI; dened in their original continuous form, are all statistically signicant: di¤erently from
FDL (panel II) and FTL (panel I), and, more generally, to the results in the whole analysis conducted
a low ROI do not display a growth in liabilities di¤erent from other country groups. The fact that the coe¢ cient of
SI ROI is instead positive and statistically signicant implies that countries with a high SI and a high ROI display
a growth in liabilities signicantly larger than other country groups, consistently with our hypothesis.
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so far, the growth in foreign portfolio liabilities in the rst quarter of 2020, is signicantly associated
also with the continuous version of the stringency index SI, of the risk of openness ROI, and of
their interaction. It means that, while the growth in foreign direct liabilities only respond to high
versus low indexes, foreign portfolio liabilities are tilted by a cross-country marginal di¤erence of the
stringency index within economies with a varying degree of openness risk exposure. For instance,
the results in column (4) of panel III, can be read as follows: an increase in the SI index, originally
ranging from 0 to 100, by 1 unit leads to a lower growth in FPL by 1.46% if the risk of openness
ROI is set at its minimum, that is equal to 0, while the same increase in the SI index by 1 unit
leads to an increase in the growth of FPL by 0.7% (0.0070=-0.0146+0.0217), when the level of risk
of openness is set at its maximum, that is equal to 1. This evidence points to a tighter and closer
responsiveness of foreign portfolio liabilities to the stringency measures adopted and to the COVID
risk exposure of the country, and is in line with the results in Giofre(2020b), conrming a general
higher reactivity by foreign portfolio investors than by direct investors in the immediate aftermath
of the crisis.
Overall, the results of Table 7 show that our ndings and the evidence in Giofre(2020b) are both
consistent within a more general framework: on the one hand, the role of the standard deviation
of the stringency index SI survives as a signicant driver of foreign portfolio investment, and, on
the other hand, the inclusion of a potentially correlated regressor, such as SI, does not a¤ect the
validity of our ndings, and even enriches the analysis, by unfolding a peculiar sensitivity of foreign
portfolio investors to the adoption of COVID containment measures at the end of the rst quarter
of 2020.
5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the evolution of foreign investment in the immediate aftermath of the adop-
tion of stringency measures to restrain the spread of COVID-19. Investors scrutinize sources of risk
and the means through which this risk can be reduced. Foreign investors could therefore be deterred
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from or attracted by investing in a country adopting more radical stringency measures, depending
on how these policies are perceived in terms of commitment to stability, lower uncertainty, and then
higher adjusted risk-returns in the near future. We nd that the non signicant correlation between
the average quarterly stringency index and inward foreign investment at the end of the rst quarter
of 2020 hides a source of heterogeneity across countries: the response of investorsbehavior to the
adoption of COVID restrictive policies depends indeed on the level of pandemic risk of the economy.
Specically, the extent to which severe containment measures, as measured by the government strin-
gency index, signicantly a¤ects the inward foreign investment in a country depends on its level of
risk connected with the non-adoption or removal of these stringency measures, as proxied by the risk
of openness index.
The empirical evidence relative to the end of the rst quarter of 2020 actually shows that foreign
investors value the assets issued by countries, which calibrate the stringency measures to the risk of
openness. On the one hand, they highly rate the implementation of strong containment measures
in countries with high risk of openness. On the other hand, they appear to avoid investing in those
countries adopting weak stringency measures despite a high risk of openness, or those implementing
drastic stringency measures in the presence of a low risk of openness.
It is worth emphasizing that the objective of this research is to establish the existence of a
connection between COVID restrictive measures and foreign investorsallocation choices, and not
to question the appropriateness of the containment measures imposed by di¤erent countries: the
policies adopted represent the country-specic reactions to country-specic conditions, in terms of
severity of cases, deaths, and pre-existing e¢ ciency of the national health system. Indeed, severity
and speed of adoption of policies in di¤erent countries can be strictly related to the severity of the
e¤ects of the COVID spread, which has shown a remarkable cross-country heterogeneity, for reasons
that are worth investigating in the near future. This paper emphasizes the importance of taking
into account this multifaceted heterogeneity, by considering how the diversity in the risk of openness
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Figure 1. Quarterly growth in Foreign Total Liabilities
This gure reports the distribution and main statistics of the growth in Foreign Total Liabilities at the
end of the rst quarter 2020. Figure 1a) refers to the growth measure q1, as dened in equation (1),
while gure 1b) refers to the growth measure diffq1, as dened in equation (4). To enhance readability,
growth rates are reported in percentage.
Figure 2. Semi-annual growth in Foreign Total Liabilities
This gure replicates Figure 1, but is referred to the rst semester of 2020, rather than to the rst
quarter. To enhance readability, growth rates are reported in percentage.
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Figure 3. Stringency Index: within-country average (by quarter)
This gure reports the distribution and main descriptive statistics of the average within-country Strin-
gency Index, SI. Panel a) refers to the rst quarter of 2020, while panel b) refers to the second quarter of
2020.
Figure 4. Risk of Openness: within-country average (by quarter)
This gure reports the distribution and main descriptive statistics of the average within-country Risk of
Openness, ROI. Panel a) refers to the rst quarter of 2020, while panel b) refers to the second quarter of
2020.
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Table 1. Correlation matrix of COVID regressors
This table reports the correlation matrix of COVID-related regressors. The upper panel refers to the
rst quarter of 2020, while the second one refers to the second quarter. Statistically signicant Pearson-
correlation coe¢ cients are reported in bold characters (t-test p-values in square brackets).
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Table 2. Main ndings: q1
This table reports the results of a Robust Least Squares regression (M-estimation), following equation
(3). The dependent variable is the quarterly growth in Foreign Total Liabilities, at the end of the rst
quarter of 2020, dened as in equation (1). In columns (5a) and (5b), the Stringency Index (SI) and
the Risk of Openness Index (ROI) are re-decoded as binary variables 0-1, if, respectively, their average
quarterly value is, respectively, below or above the mean (column (5a)), or median (column (5b)). ***, **,
and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Main findings
∆q1 SI & ROI (0-1)
> mean > median > mean > median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b)
Stringency Index (SI) 0.0009 0.0008 -0.0094 0.0144 -0.0579 ** -0.0685 ** -0.0584 ** -0.0644 **
( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0061 ) ( 0.0092 ) ( 0.0231 ) ( 0.0288 ) ( 0.0233 ) ( 0.0292 )
Risk of Openness Index (ROI) -0.0531 -0.3834 * -0.3513 * -0.0429 ** -0.0672 *** -0.0360 * -0.0634 **
( 0.0813 ) ( 0.2123 ) ( 0.2034 ) ( 0.0211 ) ( 0.0253 ) ( 0.0209 ) ( 0.0256 )
SI · ROI 0.0155 0.0144 0.1054 *** 0.1054 *** 0.0933 *** 0.1016 ***
( 0.0095 ) ( 0.0092 ) ( 0.0306 ) ( 0.0346 ) ( 0.0296 ) ( 0.0350 )
new COVID deaths per mn -0.0061 -0.0052 0.0094 -0.0250 0.0046
( 0.0270 ) ( 0.0274 ) ( 0.0260 ) ( 0.0228 ) ( 0.0225 )
new COVID cases per mn -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0002
( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0010 )
high_GDPcap 0.0455 ** 0.0461 ** 0.0422 ** 0.0482 *** 0.0452 *** 0.0517 *** 0.0454 *** 0.0525 ***
( 0.0179 ) ( 0.0186 ) ( 0.0176 ) ( 0.0184 ) ( 0.0156 ) ( 0.0176 ) ( 0.0163 ) ( 0.0184 )
high_MCAP/GDP -0.0575 * -0.0545 * -0.0218 -0.0255 -0.0352 0.0297 * -0.0298 0.0261
( 0.0318 ) ( 0.0325 ) ( 0.0302 ) ( 0.0298 ) ( 0.0279 ) ( 0.0175 ) ( 0.0274 ) ( 0.0178 )
∆ NEER (1-month lag) 0.7482 0.7504 0.7384 0.6159 0.6998 1.0991 ** 0.4733 1.0052 *
( 0.6070 ) ( 0.6155 ) ( 0.5761 ) ( 0.5722 ) ( 0.5198 ) ( 0.5363 ) ( 0.5163 ) ( 0.5475 )
#obs 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
R2 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.19
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Table 3. Main ndings: diffq1
This table is the same as Table 2, but the dependent variable is constructed as diffq1 in equation
(4). ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Main findings
diff∆q1 SI & ROI (0-1)
> mean > median > mean > median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b)
Stringency Index (SI) -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0099 * -0.0079 -0.0641 *** -0.0560 ** -0.0616 ** -0.0561 **
( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0059 ) ( 0.0058 ) ( 0.0244 ) ( 0.0261 ) ( 0.0247 ) ( 0.0261 )
Risk of Openness Index (ROI) -0.0631 -0.4025 ** -0.3573 * -0.0422 * -0.0590 *** -0.0413 * -0.0595 ***
( 0.0716 ) ( 0.2043 ) ( 0.2022 ) ( 0.0221 ) ( 0.0225 ) ( 0.0221 ) ( 0.0225 )
SI · ROI 0.0155 * 0.0130 0.0850 *** 0.0804 ** 0.0826 *** 0.0815 ***
( 0.0092 ) ( 0.0092 ) ( 0.0320 ) ( 0.0315 ) ( 0.0312 ) ( 0.0313 )
new COVID deaths per mn 0.0129 0.0131 0.0252 -0.0015 0.0034
( 0.0235 ) ( 0.0240 ) ( 0.0252 ) ( 0.0241 ) ( 0.0205 )
new COVID cases per mn 0.0009 0.0003 0.0002
( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0009 )
high_GDPcap 0.0075 0.0115 0.0218 0.0209 0.0227 0.0472 *** 0.0195 0.0465 ***
( 0.0160 ) ( 0.0169 ) ( 0.0176 ) ( 0.0193 ) ( 0.0169 ) ( 0.0165 ) ( 0.0182 ) ( 0.0173 )
high_MCAP/GDP -0.0053 -0.0088 -0.0092 -0.0130 -0.0187 0.0017 -0.0175 0.0016
( 0.0276 ) ( 0.0283 ) ( 0.0292 ) ( 0.0297 ) ( 0.0292 ) ( 0.0157 ) ( 0.0291 ) ( 0.0158 )
∆ NEER (1-month lag) 0.0890 0.1013 0.3697 0.4764 0.5280 0.5009 0.5401 0.5329
( 0.3682 ) ( 0.3775 ) ( 0.3917 ) ( 0.4075 ) ( 0.3882 ) ( 0.3565 ) ( 0.3943 ) ( 0.3586 )
#obs 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
R2 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.16
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Table 4. Main ndings: s1 and diffs1
This table replicates Table 2 and 3, but relative to the rst semester of 2020. In panel I, the dependent
variable is constructed following the structure of equation (1), while in panel II, the dependent variable
follows the structure of equation (4). The econometric specication is the same as in previous tables: it also
includes the controls reported at the bottom of the table.
Main findings
I. ∆s1 SI & ROI (0-1) SI & ROI (0-1)
> mean > median > mean > median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b)
Stringency Index (SI) 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0009 -0.0233 -0.0048 -0.0008 0.0021
( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0017 ) ( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0253 ) ( 0.0241 ) ( 0.0185 ) ( 0.0172 )
Risk of Openness Index (ROI) -0.0415 -0.0307 0.0289 -0.0312 * -0.0214 -0.0224 -0.0223 *
( 0.0564 ) ( 0.2501 ) ( 0.2575 ) ( 0.0160 ) ( 0.0158 ) ( 0.0149 ) ( 0.0134 )
SI · ROI -0.0002 -0.0017 0.0415 0.0163 0.0154 0.0106
( 0.0037 ) ( 0.0039 ) ( 0.0294 ) ( 0.0276 ) ( 0.0238 ) ( 0.0229 )
new COVID deaths per mn -0.0040 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0030 -0.0014
( 0.0034 ) ( 0.0039 ) ( 0.0040 ) ( 0.0035 ) ( 0.0032 )
new COVID cases per mn 0.0002 -0.0007 0.0001
( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0031 ) ( 0.0002 )
#obs 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
R2 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.36
II. diff∆s1 SI & ROI (0-1) SI & ROI (0-1)
> mean > median > mean > median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5a) (5a) (6a) (6b)
Stringency Index (SI) -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0020 0.0023 -0.0352 0.0067 0.0276 0.0066
( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0020 ) ( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0325 ) ( 0.0268 ) ( 0.0385 ) ( 0.0274 )
Risk of Openness Index (ROI) -0.0454 0.2318 0.2587 -0.0263 -0.0105 -0.0259 -0.0126
( 0.0731 ) ( 0.2903 ) ( 0.2985 ) ( 0.0206 ) ( 0.0217 ) ( 0.0208 ) ( 0.0215 )
SI · ROI -0.0043 -0.0050 0.0336 -0.0179 -0.0001 -0.0189
( 0.0042 ) ( 0.0045 ) ( 0.0377 ) ( 0.0342 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0362 )
new COVID deaths per mn -0.0055 -0.0043 -0.0040 -0.0044 -0.0015
( 0.0044 ) ( 0.0050 ) ( 0.0047 ) ( 0.0045 ) ( 0.0045 )
new COVID cases per mn 0.0000 -0.0413 0.0000
( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0279 ) ( 0.0003 )
#obs 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
R2 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.27 0.15 0.23
other controls: (lag) NEER, high_GDP per capita, high_MCAP/GDP
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Table 5. Sensitivity analysis: econometric model and sample specication
This table reports the results of the sensitivity analysis to di¤erent specications of econometric model
and sample. In Panel I, the dependent variable is the growth of Foreign Total Liabilities, q1, as dened
in equation (1), while in Panel II the dependent variable is diffq1, as dened in equation (4). For the
sake of brevity, only results with binary denition of SI_d and ROI_d (1 if above the mean, 0 otherwise)
are reported. Column 1 of Panel I and II reports, for comparability, the results under a Robust Least
Squares estimation of column (5a) of Table 2 and 3, respectively. Column 2 and 3 report the results of the
same regression under a standard OLS estimation and a Quantile regression computed at the median of the
dependent variable. Columns (4) to (5c) report results when excluding China (columns (4)), or o¤shore
countries (from columns (5a) to (5c)) from the sample. O¤shore countries are dened according to three
alternative o¤shore denitions: column (5a) follows the classication in Damgaard et al. (2018), column




I. ∆q1 RLS OLS Quantile model (q50) No China No offshore
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5a) (5b) (5c)
Stringency Index (SI_d) -0.0579 ** -0.0526 ** -0.0779 ** -0.0617 ** -0.0732 *** -0.0689 *** -0.0698 ***
( 0.0231 ) ( 0.0251 ) ( 0.0327 ) ( 0.0258 ) ( 0.0245 ) ( 0.0225 ) ( 0.0172 )
Risk of Openness Index (ROI_d) -0.0429 ** -0.0460 * -0.0548 ** -0.0431 * -0.0421 * -0.0507 ** -0.0601 ***
( 0.0211 ) ( 0.0229 ) ( 0.0255 ) ( 0.0240 ) ( 0.0224 ) ( 0.0207 ) ( 0.0160 )
SI_d · ROI_d 0.1054 *** 0.1031 *** 0.1308 *** 0.0974 *** 0.1172 *** 0.1250 *** 0.1342 ***
( 0.0306 ) ( 0.0332 ) ( 0.0445 ) ( 0.0339 ) ( 0.0320 ) ( 0.0292 ) ( 0.0218 )
new COVID deaths per mn -0.0250 -0.0206 -0.0274 -0.0188 -0.0254 -0.0261 -0.0231
( 0.0228 ) ( 0.0247 ) ( 0.0197 ) ( 0.0245 ) ( 0.0231 ) ( 0.0208 ) ( 0.0167 )
#obs 53 53 53 52 49 47 45
R2 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.16 0.22 0.26 0.27
II. diff∆q1 RLS OLS Quantile model (q50) No China No offshore
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5a) (5b) (5c)
Stringency Index (SI_d) -0.0641 *** -0.0661 ** -0.0658 -0.0705 *** -0.0801 *** -0.0742 *** -0.0694 **
( 0.0244 ) ( 0.0285 ) ( 0.0405 ) ( 0.0260 ) ( 0.0268 ) ( 0.0244 ) ( 0.0288 )
Risk of Openness Index (ROI_d) -0.0422 * -0.0517 * -0.0381 -0.0491 ** -0.0375 -0.0474 ** -0.0525 **
( 0.0221 ) ( 0.0258 ) ( 0.0322 ) ( 0.0240 ) ( 0.0245 ) ( 0.0224 ) ( 0.0261 )
(SI_d) · (ROI_d) 0.0850 *** 0.1001 ** 0.0921 * 0.0949 *** 0.0927 *** 0.0978 *** 0.0894 **
( 0.0320 ) ( 0.0374 ) ( 0.0543 ) ( 0.0339 ) ( 0.0347 ) ( 0.0315 ) ( 0.0361 )
new COVID deaths per mn -0.0015 -0.0027 -0.0040 0.0006 0.0029 -0.0037 0.0090
( 0.0241 ) ( 0.0281 ) ( 0.0247 ) ( 0.0247 ) ( 0.0254 ) ( 0.0226 ) ( 0.0273 )
#obs 53 53 53 52 49 47 45
R2 0.11 0.29 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.14
other controls: (lag) NEER, high_GDP per capita, high_MCAP/GDP
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Table 6. Di¤erent country grouping
This table replicates, in columns (1a) and (1b), for comparability, the results of columns (5a) and (5b)
of Table 2. Columns (2a) to (4b) reports results under a country grouping alternative to the classication
relying on GDP per capita. Columns (#a) considers binary indicators of SI and ROI with the mean as
a benchmark, while columns (#b) considers the median as a benchmark. The econometric specication is
the same as in previous tables: it also includes the controls reported at the bottom of the table.
Different groupings
∆q1 high_GDPcap advanced G7 Euro area
> mean > median > mean > median > mean > median > mean > median
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
Stringency Index (SI_d) -0.0579 ** -0.0685 ** -0.0526 ** -0.0594 ** -0.0442 ** -0.0350 -0.0266 -0.0467
( 0.0231 ) ( 0.0288 ) ( 0.0230 ) ( 0.0295 ) ( 0.0196 ) ( 0.0246 ) ( 0.0249 ) ( 0.0289 )
Risk of Openness Index (ROI_d) -0.0429 ** -0.0672 *** -0.0393 * -0.0550 ** -0.0197 -0.0220 -0.0225 -0.0491 **
( 0.0211 ) ( 0.0253 ) ( 0.0208 ) ( 0.0255 ) ( 0.0175 ) ( 0.0211 ) ( 0.0211 ) ( 0.0246 )
SI_d · ROI_d 0.1054 *** 0.1054 *** 0.1007 *** 0.0947 *** 0.0538 ** 0.0481 0.0574 * 0.0767 **
( 0.0306 ) ( 0.0346 ) ( 0.0303 ) ( 0.0352 ) ( 0.0256 ) ( 0.0294 ) ( 0.0328 ) ( 0.0345 )
new COVID deaths per mn -0.0250 0.0046 -0.0215 -0.0023 -0.0231 -0.0192 -0.0168 -0.0063
( 0.0228 ) ( 0.0225 ) ( 0.0224 ) ( 0.0238 ) ( 0.0192 ) ( 0.0202 ) ( 0.0239 ) ( 0.0240 )
high_MCAP/GDP -0.0352 0.0297 * -0.0159 0.0230 -0.0134 0.0020 -0.0103 0.0332 *
( 0.0279 ) ( 0.0175 ) ( 0.0274 ) ( 0.0181 ) ( 0.0233 ) ( 0.0154 ) ( 0.0283 ) ( 0.0177 )
high_GDPcap 0.0452 *** 0.0517 ***
( 0.0156 ) ( 0.0176 )
advanced 0.0433 *** 0.0399 **
( 0.0154 ) ( 0.0164 )
G7 0.0737 *** 0.0679 ***
( 0.0194 ) ( 0.0205 )
Euro area 0.0294 * 0.0412 **
( 0.0177 ) ( 0.0178 )
∆ NEER (1-month lag) 0.6998 1.0991 ** 0.5822 0.8413 1.4856 *** 1.3557 *** 0.5997 0.8960 *
( 0.5198 ) ( 0.5363 ) ( 0.5235 ) ( 0.5555 ) ( 0.4455 ) ( 0.4613 ) ( 0.5382 ) ( 0.5365 )
#obs 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
R2 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.18
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Figure 5. Quarterly growth in Foreign Direct and Portfolio Liabilities
This gure reports the distribution and main statistics of the growth in Direct and Portfolio Liabilities
at the end of the rst quarter 2020, as dened in equation (1). To enhance readability, growth rates are
reported in percentage.
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Table 7. Di¤erent liabilities and SI
This table reports the results of a regression including also the within-country standard deviation of the
stringency index (SI). Panel I refers to Foreign Total Liabilities, panel II to Foreign Direct Liabilities,
and panel III to Foreign Portfolio Liabilities
Different liabilities
∆q1 SI & ROI (0-1)
new deaths new cases new deaths per mn new cases per mn
I. FTL (Foreign Total Liabilities) per mn  per mnper n > mean > median > mean > median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b)
Stringency Index (SI) 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0048 -0.0087 -0.0627 *** -0.0130 -0.0593 ** -0.0147
( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0064 ) ( 0.0058 ) ( 0.0204 ) ( 0.0265 ) ( 0.0238 ) ( 0.0266 )
Risk of Openness Index (ROI) -0.0418 -0.2188 -0.3513 * -0.0351 * -0.0379 -0.0318 -0.0378
( 0.0794 ) ( 0.2261 ) ( 0.2034 ) ( 0.0188 ) ( 0.0247 ) ( 0.0215 ) ( 0.0246 )
SI · ROI 0.0083 0.0144 0.1065 *** 0.0573 * 0.0876 *** 0.0568 *
( 0.0101 ) ( 0.0092 ) ( 0.0271 ) ( 0.0332 ) ( 0.0305 ) ( 0.0330 )
st.dev. stringency indexj (σSI) 0.0027 * 0.0026 * 0.0023 -0.0255 0.0031 *** 0.0019 0.0016 0.0017
( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0298 ) ( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0013 )
#obs 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
R2 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.25
SI & ROI (0-1)
new deaths new cases new deaths per mn new cases per mn
II. FDL (Foreign Direct liabilities) per mn  per mnper n > mean > median > mean > median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b)
Stringency Index (SI) -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0074 -0.0078 -0.0819 *** -0.0118 -0.0899 *** -0.0170
( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0062 ) ( 0.0056 ) ( 0.0235 ) ( 0.0329 ) ( 0.0229 ) ( 0.0332 )
Risk of Openness Index (ROI) -0.0410 -0.2813 -0.2802 -0.0269 -0.0166 -0.0260 -0.0184
( 0.0943 ) ( 0.2192 ) ( 0.1959 ) ( 0.0216 ) ( 0.0307 ) ( 0.0207 ) ( 0.0307 )
SI · ROI 0.0113 0.0118 0.1028 *** 0.0338 0.1003 *** 0.0353
( 0.0098 ) ( 0.0088 ) ( 0.0313 ) ( 0.0413 ) ( 0.0294 ) ( 0.0413 )
st.dev. stringency indexj (σSI) 0.0034 * 0.0033 * 0.0021 0.0025 * 0.0021 0.0033 * 0.0014 0.0028 *
( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0017 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0016 )
#obs 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.14
SI & ROI (0-1)
new deaths new cases new deaths per mn new cases per mn
III. FPL (Foreign Portfolio liabilities) per mn  per mnper n > mean > median > mean > median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b)
Stringency Index (SI) -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0146 ** -0.0157 *** -0.0639 ** -0.0266 -0.0554 * -0.0109 *
( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0058 ) ( 0.0055 ) ( 0.0273 ) ( 0.0264 ) ( 0.0291 ) ( 0.0060 )
Risk of Openness Index (ROI) -0.0474 -0.5344 *** -0.5848 *** -0.0453 * -0.0343 -0.0410 -0.4153 *
( 0.0902 ) ( 0.2053 ) ( 0.1936 ) ( 0.0251 ) ( 0.0233 ) ( 0.0262 ) ( 0.2134 )
SI · ROI 0.0217 ** 0.0234 *** 0.0906 ** 0.0585 * 0.0780 ** 0.0177 *
( 0.0092 ) ( 0.0087 ) ( 0.0363 ) ( 0.0318 ) ( 0.0373 ) ( 0.0095 )
st.dev. stringency indexj (σSI) 0.0064 *** 0.0065 *** 0.0048 *** 0.0042 *** 0.0046 *** 0.0048 *** 0.0033 ** 0.0036 **
( 0.0017 ) ( 0.0017 ) ( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0014 )
#obs 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
R2 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.26 0.13 0.22












The liabilities L considered are Total Foreign Liabilities, with the exception of Table 7, which
also considers Foreign Direct Liabilities and Foreign Portfolio Liabilities.
Source: International Investment Position Statistics (IMF)
Baseline sample
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croa-
tia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
O¤shore countries
In Tables 5, we restrict the sample to exclude potential o¤shore countries. Column (4a) refers
to the o¤shore classication specied in Damgaard et al. (2018): from our original sample, Hong
Kong, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Singapore are excluded. Column (4b) refers to
the o¤shore classication specied in Zoromé (2007): from our original sample Cyprus, Hong Kong,
Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Singapore, Switzerland and United Kingdom are excluded.
Column (4c) refers to the o¤shore classication specied in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017): from
our original sample Belgium, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,




The Stringency Index is a daily aggregate measure of the overall stringency of containment and
closure policies. It is calculated by taking the ordinal value and adding a weighted constant if
the policy is general rather than targeted, if applicable, which are then re-scaled by their max-
imum value to create a score between 0 and 100. More information can be found at Oxfords
Government Response Tracker, https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/coronavirus-
government-response-tracker
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In our analysis, we consider and report as regressors both the quarterly overall mean of the daily
stringency index (SI) and its quarterly standard deviation (SI), in Table 7, computed within each
country over the corresponding quarter.
Source: https://github.com/OxCGRT/covid-policy-tracker
Risk of Openness Index (ROI)
The Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) provides a cross-national
overview of the risk and response of di¤erent countries as they tighten and relax physical distancing
measures. The Risk of Openness Index is based on the recommendations set out by the World Health
Organisation (WHO) of the measures that should be put in place before Covid-19 response policies
can be safely relaxed. Considering that many countries have already started to lift measures, the
Risk of Openness Index is a reviewed version of our previous Lockdown rollback checklist.
While the OxCGRT data cannot say precisely the risk faced by each country, it does provide for
a rough comparison across nations. Even this high levelview reveals that many countries are still
facing considerable risks as they ease the stringency of policies.
Source: https://github.com/OxCGRT/covid-policy-tracker
Other controls
New COVID death per mn
This is a daily variable, reported by the countriesauthorities. In our analysis, we consider both
the quarterly average of new COVID-19 deaths and its standard deviation, computed within each
country over the corresponding quarter.
Source: https://github.com
New COVID cases per mn
This is a daily variable, reported by the countriesauthorities. In our analysis, we consider both
the average quarterly number of new COVID-19 cases and its standard deviation, computed within
each country over the corresponding quarter.
Source: https://github.com
Nominal E¤ective Exchange Rate
BIS e¤ective exchange rate Nominal, Broad Indices Monthly averages; 2010=100. The NEER
regressor is included with the same structure as the dependent variable. For instance, if the de-
pendent variable is q1 as dened in equation (1), then the regressor included is (NEER03_20  
NEER12_19)=NEER12_19
Source: Bank for International Settlements
High MCAP/GDP
Market capitalization to GDP (year: 2019, or latest available data). The regressor included is a
binary variable equal to 1 if the market capitalization per GDP is larger than the sample mean, and
0 otherwise.
Source: CEIC data
High GDP per capita
The regressor included is a binary variable equal to 1 if the GDP per capita is larger than the
sample median, and 0 otherwise.
GDP per capita (year: 2019, or latest available data).
Source: CEIC data
Advanced, G7, Euro area
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The regressor included is a binary variable equal to 1 if the country belongs to the "advanced",
"G7", or "Euro area" group, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
Source: Fiscal Monitor database, IMFs Fiscal A¤airs Department.
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